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Inequality, Innovation, and Patents
By Colleen Chien1
ABSTRACT
This article explores the relationship between patents, innovation, and inequality, making three
contributions. First, it reveals how shifts in patented innovation over the last several decades
have contributed to broader social and economic shifts, away from manufacturing-based,
domestic, and independent innovation, and towards digital, foreign, and corporate innovation,
validating both optimistic accounts of immigration-driven, digital prosperity and pessimistic
accounts of the shrinking role of domestic innovators. Second, it offers a framework for
understanding the relationship between innovation and inequality that includes both the
potentially inequality-increasing impacts of innovation and the potentially inequality-decreasing
impacts of innovation and specifies the contribution of intellectual property to these dynamics.
To minimize the risk of inequality-driven stagnation and maximize the social benefits of
innovation, it argues, more attention should be paid to inclusion in innovation, and on tracking
not only the amount but distribution of innovation. Demonstrating the value of this approach, it
documents the striking concentration of new patents in the hands of the few, with 53% of new
grants in 2016 going to the top 1% of grantees (up from 38% in 1986), an all-time high, as well
as the decline in the share of patent filings by small and micro entities from from 33% in 2000 to
28.5% in 2015.
Introduction
On June 12, 2013, a group of nine inventors filed for a patent covering techniques for
optimizing database automation.2 The application was one of two that year to one of the
inventors, and he received a $1,126 bonus for his efforts.3 The company missed its financial
targets, so the inventor did not get a salary or a performance bonus. And yet, he received $2,999
in legal services, $1.5 million for a residential security perk, and $76.9 million in stock awards.
The inventor was Larry Ellison of Oracle.4 Consistently among the most highly paid CEOs,5
1
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2
Techniques for Maintaining Column Vectors of Relational Data Within Volatile Memory, U.S. Patent No.
9,201,944 (filed June 12, 2013) (granted December 1, 2015) (hereinafter “‘944 patent”).
3
Ann Bednarz, Larry Ellison Takes $1 Salary, Declines Bonus, Still Lands $78 Million, NETWORK WORLD (Sept.
23, 2013, 11:55 AM),
http://www.networkworld.com/Essay/2170140/data-center/larry-ellison-takes--1-salary--declines-bonus--still-lands-78-million.html.
4
The patent was one of his 15. Patents by Inventor Lawrence J. Ellison, JUSTIA PATENTS,
http://patents.justia.com/inventor/lawrence-j-ellison (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
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Ellison was named the richest person in California in 2015 in a crowded field of technology and
other entrepreneurs.6 Including Ellison, 11 of the 50 people on the 2015 “richest individuals” list
has patents to their name.7
What is the relationship between innovation, intellectual property, and inequality? When
recounting the major theories of intellectual property, Fisher found the proposition that
intellectual property should advance “just and attractive culture” to be so underdeveloped that it
lacked a cohesive theory.8 There are a few reasons this is the case. First, the primary purpose of
intellectual property is to, as stated in the Constitution “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”9 Studies of intellectual property law have, by and large, reflected this utilitarian
focus on growing the (innovation) pie, as it were, rather than how the pie is distributed. Second,
there is a plausible argument that questions of equity fall largely outside the domain of private
law and should be left to redistributive instruments like welfare and tax policy.10 Finally, while
the literature regarding the relationship between technology and inequality is vast, it’s not clear
what intellectual property has to add. For example, though much debate surrounds the extent to
which technical changes associated with computer technologies favor the skilled, or are
otherwise “skills-biased,”11 the so-called “machinery question,” as economist David Ricardo first
5

Bednarz, supra note __.
In 2016, for example, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook replaced Ellison as the richest person in California. See Dan
Alexander, Meet the Richest Person in Every State, FORBES (May 25, 2016, 9:45 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2016/05/25/meet-the-richest-person-in-every-state-2016billionaires/#114d235745ef. Accord Scott Klinger & Holly Sklar, Titans of the Enron Economy: The Ten Habits of
Highly Defective Corporations, in IT'S LEGAL BUT IT AIN'T RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL
INDUSTRIES 230, 236 tbl.2 (Nikos Passas & Neva Goodwin eds. 2004) (naming Larry Ellison the highest paid CEO
from 1998–2001).
7
Philippe Aghion et al., Innovation and Top Income Inequality, (Apr. 11, 2016) (unpublished working paper),
available at
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/aghion/files/innovation_and_top_income_inequality.pdf?m=1460399019.
8
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property 2, 8 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf. Accord Justin Merges & Robert P. Hughes, Copyright and
Distributive Justice, 92 Nᴏᴛʀᴇ Dᴀᴍᴇ L. Rᴇᴠ. 513 (describing questions of distributive justice and copyright as
“atypical”), Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, 92 Wᴀꜱʜ. U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 117, 121 (2014) (“questions of social
inequality and distributive justice lie in the peripheral vision of copyright scholarship”). For a bibliography of
papers on intellectual property and distributive justice, see Lisa Ouellette, Crowdsourced Bibliography on IP and
Distributive Justice, Wʀɪᴛᴛᴇɴ Dᴇꜱᴄʀɪᴘᴛɪᴏɴ (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/01/crowdsourced-bibliography-on-ip-and.html. For
explorations of the concepts of equality and equity, see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Hᴀʀᴠ. L.
Rᴇᴠ. 537, 537 (1982).
9
U.S. Cᴏɴꜱᴛ. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 23 J. Lᴇɢᴀʟ Sᴛᴜᴅ. 667 (1994). See also Richard Epstein, Innovation and Inequality: The Separability
Thesis, 39 Hᴀʀᴠ. J. L. Pᴜʙ. Pᴏʟ’ʏ. 1 (2016) (arguing in favor of a strict division between promoting innovation and
redistributing wealth)
11
Daron Acemoglu, Technology and Inequality, Nᴀᴛ’ʟ. Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜ Eᴄᴏɴ. Rᴇꜱᴇᴀʀᴄʜ (Winter 2003) (describing
skill-biased technical change as “technical change [that] favors more skilled (educated) workers, replaces tasks
previously performed by the unskilled, and increases the demand for skills”),
http://www.nber.org/reporter/winter03/technologyandinequality.html#N_3. His Essay provides a short and useful,
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called it in 182312 is about just that, the interface of humans and technology, with intellectualproperty incentives barely registering as an afterthought.
But recent developments have brought the topic of innovation and inequality to the fore.
Innovative companies have been receiving an increasing amount of public attention, and not the
good kind. Every day, it seems, there is a new headline blaming innovative tech companies for
being addictive, overly dominant,13 sexist,14 or in general, as “bad for consumers and
competition.”15 Pharmaceutical firms, long portrayed as perpetrators of global inequality due to
the high prices of patented drugs, have been the subject of recent investigations of price
gouging16 and fueling the opioid epidemic.17
Economists are paying attention as well. In their quest to discover the culprits behind the
dramatic increases in income and wealth inequality made famous by Piketty, Saez, and others,
economists have turned to innovation. Studies have uncovered striking links between patenting
trends and income inequality, as well as evidence that many children with talent but not privilege
– so-called “lost Einsteins”18 – are slipping between the cracks. Distributional concerns have
played a prominent role in recent intellectual property decisions as well. In Myriad, the Supreme
Court disrupted decades of patent law precedent in order to side with patient groups and lowincome women whose Medicaid coverage would not reimburse the cost of a diagnostic test for
breast cancer in their battle against the patent holder.19 Although software patents have been
controversial for decades,20 it was arguably not until the issue was framed as a matter of patent
although dated, overview of the literature on economics studies of technology and inequality.
12
Dᴀᴠɪᴅ Rɪᴄᴀʀᴅᴏ, Oɴ ᴛʜᴇ Pʀɪɴᴄɪᴘʟᴇꜱ ᴏꜰ Pᴏʟɪᴛɪᴄᴀʟ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍʏ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴀxᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, 380 (R. M. Hartwell ed., 3d
ed., Harmondsworth: Pelican Classics 1971) (1817). See The Return of the Machinery Question, Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪꜱᴛ,
June 25, 2016, at 1.
13
How To Tame The Tech Titans, Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪꜱᴛ, Jan. 18, 2018 (chronicling allegations that tech products are
addictive and shareholder demands that Apple take actions to ameliorate the addictiveness of its products as well as
the chorus of accusations that tech titans have become too large and anti-competitive).
14
See, e.g., Liza Mundy, Why Is Silicon Valley So Awful to Women?, Aᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ, Mar. 14, 2017.
15
How to Tame the Tech Titans, Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪꜱᴛ, supra note __.
16
See, e.g., Dᴇᴍᴏᴄʀᴀᴛɪᴄ Sᴛᴀꜰꜰ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ Cᴏᴍᴍ. ᴏɴ Oᴠᴇʀꜱɪɢʜᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Gᴏᴠ’ᴛ Rᴇꜰᴏʀᴍ, 114ᴛʜ Cᴏɴɢ.,
Dᴏᴄᴜᴍᴇɴᴛꜱ Oʙᴛᴀɪɴᴇᴅ ʙʏ Cᴏᴍᴍ. ꜰʀᴏᴍ Tᴜʀɪɴɢ Pʜᴀʀᴍ. (Feb. 2, 2016) (House Democrat report investigating
Turing Pharmaceuticals’ “massive increase in [drug] price[s]”).
17
Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family That Built An Empire Of Pain, Nᴇᴡ Yᴏʀᴋᴇʀ, Oct. 30, 2017, at __ (describing
the marketing done by the pharmaceutical industry to promote the prescription of opioid painkillers as aggressive
and misleading.)
18
Described in Part II, infra.
19
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576
(2013) (No. 11-725) (listing as plaintiffs patients Ms. Ceriani, Ms. Limary, Ms. Girard, Ms. Fortune, Ms. Thomason,
Ms. Raker, all women diagnosed who could not afford the full cost of the Myriad test), at 127a-129a; Brief of
Amicus Curiae for AARP in Support of Petitioners at 14, Myriad, 569 U.S. 576 (No. 12-398) (discussing in depth
“the [acute] access problems created by exclusive gene patents … for [ ] low-income individuals” and the contested
patents as a “significant source of disparate access to genetic tests and services, especially since Medicaid
beneficiaries may not have other health insurance coverage or be able to pay for care out-of-pocket” given
differences in reimbursement).
20
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 Hᴏᴜꜱ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 325, 327-30 (2012) (discussing the
history of the software patent controversy, beginning with a 1967 Presidential Commission Report cautioning
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“trolls” versus startups and small businesses21 that the momentum for significant change was set
in motion, resulting in decisions that made it harder to patent business methods and software.22
It is important to acknowledge that rising inequality does not necessarily translate into
declining social welfare including for those at the bottom. Nor is inequality an evil to be
eliminated – indeed, according to the “Difference” principle articulated by Rawls, inequality that
provides “the greatest benefit [to][] the least advantaged” is justified.23 Inequality is actually
necessary for innovation, Hayek theorized decades ago, as, “the rate of advance will be greatly
increased if the first steps are taken long before the majority can profit from them.”24 Innovation,
in turn, supports greater productivity, growth, and social mobility as evidenced by the large
numbers of “overnight millionaires”25 in the tech sector. Tech products have reduced the cost of
electronics, eliminated tedious work, and produced great consumer surpluses not only for the
rich but for the masses.26
However, the developments described above highlight some of the negative side effects
of exacerbated inequality: instability (in the law of patentable subject matter), corporate rentseeking and malfeasance (by pharmaceuticals), and the underdevelopment of innovative talent
(“lost geniuses”). If some inequality is good, too much is problematic, and can discourage hard
work, seed upheavals, and limit long-term growth.27 The lack of a common framework for
integrating diverse perspectives and evidence has left decision-makers concerned about the
current state of affairs with a siloed and incomplete understanding of the complex relationship
between innovation and inequality and the role of intellectual property. The lack of a common
language is compounded by a lack of a common understanding of how innovation has shifted
over time, and the extent to which it is casualty of or causing widening inequality.
This article attempts to address both gaps. It begins by providing an empirical description
of trends in patented innovation that reveal a striking correspondence between patented
innovation and general social and economic trends. It then describes a framework that includes
the ways in which innovation can both increase or decrease inequality – and argues that neither
mechanism is inevitable, but the result of context and institutional forces. It makes the case for
paying more attention to and more rigorously evaluating inclusion in innovation across the
innovation pipeline – whether in education, the cultivation of talent, legal constructs, the entry of
or patenting by new firms, or dissemination of innovation. It ends by demonstrating how
inclusion in innovation can be measured with reference to new patent grants.
against granting software patents).
21
See, e.g., Nᴀᴛ’ʟ Eᴄᴏɴ. Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ & Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏꜰ Eᴄᴏɴ. Aᴅᴠɪꜱᴇʀꜱ, Exᴇᴄ. Oꜰꜰɪᴄᴇ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Pʀᴇꜱɪᴅᴇɴᴛ, Pᴀᴛᴇɴᴛ
Aꜱꜱᴇʀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ U.S. Iɴɴᴏᴠᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, at 10-11 (2013) (citing the harm to startups of patent assertions as a reason
for patent reform).
22
See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
23
Jᴏʜɴ Rᴀᴡʟꜱ, A Tʜᴇᴏʀʏ ᴏꜰ Jᴜꜱᴛɪᴄᴇ 266 (Harv. Univ. Press 2d ed., 1999) (1971).
24
Fʀɪᴇᴅʀɪᴄʜ A. Hᴀʏᴇᴋ, Common Sense of Progress, in Tʜᴇ Cᴏɴꜱᴛɪᴛᴜᴛɪᴏɴ ᴏꜰ Lɪʙᴇʀᴛʏ 40 (1978).
25
Bruce Y. Lee, Starting a Biotech Company In a Dot.Com World, 2 Bɪᴏᴛᴇᴄʜɴᴏʟᴏɢʏ Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜᴄᴀʀᴇ 44-46, 48-50
(2005) (describing the “constant circulat[ion]” of stories of overnight millionaires and initial public offerings in
Silicon Valley in the 90s).
26
Described in Part II, infra.
27
For a discussion of these side effects within the context of institutional inequality, see Dᴀʀᴏɴ Aᴄᴇᴍᴏɢʟᴜ &
Jᴀᴍᴇꜱ A. Rᴏʙɪɴꜱᴏɴ, Wʜʏ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴꜱ Fᴀɪʟ: Tʜᴇ Oʀɪɢɪɴꜱ ᴏꜰ Pᴏᴡᴇʀ, Pʀᴏꜱᴘᴇʀɪᴛʏ, ᴀɴᴅ Pᴏᴠᴇʀᴛʏ (2012).
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Part I explores how the distribution of patented innovation has changed over the last
century. Through the lens of three patents, covering a mousetrap (from the 1890s), the material
Gore-Tex (from the 1970s), and database automation techniques (from 2015), this Part explores
how innovation has transitioned over the last several decades, away from manufacturing-based,
domestic, independent innovation, and towards information technology-based, foreign, and
coastal innovation. Rather than endorsing any single account, these trends support at least two
distinct narratives, one about growing the innovation pie, through the prosperous and diverse
digital revolution and another about the shrinking allocation of this pie to “American,”
manufacturing-based innovation.
Building on Part I, Part II offers a framework for thinking about the impact of intellectual
property on inequality that incorporates various narratives and populist accounts, theory and
evidence. The impact of any particular innovation on inequality is highly contextual and
evolving; reflecting this complexity, this framework includes both the potentially inequalityincreasing reward of rents to those with intellectual capital and skills and the potentially
inequality-decreasing broad-based diffusion of new goods and services and boost to social
mobility associated with innovation. It describes the role of intellectual property in supporting, as
well as hindering, both sets of mechanisms and argues that one key to whether or not any given
innovation makes inequality worse or better stems from inclusiveness across the innovation
pipeline. Inclusion in the production of innovation supports entry, social mobility, and the design
of products that address the problems faced by a diverse set of consumers. The dissemination of
innovative goods and services relevant to the masses at prices within their reach also fosters
broad-based productivity gains. Currently, most innovation metrics focus solely on the quantity
of innovation but this Part argues that metrics that reflect the degree of inclusiveness of
innovation – for example, reflecting entry and participation by underrepresented groups and
geographies – deserve more attention.
Part III describes one example of how to measure inclusion in innovation as
recommended by Part II, in the domain of patent filings and grants. It documents, for the first
time, both the increasingly unequal distribution of new patent grants and decreasing share of
patent filings by small entities from 2000 to the present. Based on records supplied by the
USPTO, it finds a decrease in the share of patents held by small entities from 2000 to 2015 from
33% to 29% in 2015. However, this decline has not been due to the America Invents Act; in fact
shares of individual inventor and small entity filings have slightly gone up since the Act went
into effect. Rather, strong growth in the filing for patents of large foreign corporations has been
responsible for the overall reduction in shares occupied by US independent and small inventors.
It also finds the distribution of new patents to be increasingly skewed – with the top percent of
grantees capturing 53% of new patents in 2016, up from 38% in 1986, and the share of patents to
the top 10% of grantees growing from 70% to 78%. Part IV concludes.
Part I: Three Patents, A Century of Patented Innovation, and Two Stories
Over the last several decades, the United States has become both more innovative and
more unequal. From 1980-2010, the top tenth of one percent of households doubled their income

5

INEQUALITY, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

share from 10 percent in 20 percent in 2010,28 and the top one percent of all households grew
their share of wealth from around 24% to 43%. of the total.29 Less well-known, from 1975 to
2016, the number of patents per capita issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) doubled, commensurate with other increases in knowledge intensity.30
To better understand the relationship between these two trends, it is useful to have a
picture of how innovation is distributed. Innovation comes in many forms, including creative
content, new products and services, and improvements to processes in a variety of industries and
sectors, and no single account can provide a complete view. However, the high quality of patent
records makes them the single most-relied upon measure of industrial innovation.31 This part
provides an empirical description of the distribution of patented innovation and how it has
evolved over the last several decades.
This Article began with a description of the ’944 patent to Oracle inventors. But many of
the traits that make that patent typical of its era - that it involved multiple, ethnically diverse and
immigrant inventors, that it was from California, that it covered electrical engineering, and that it
was assigned to a large corporation - distinguish it from earlier patents. Applying a historical
economic approach, this Part explores the ways that the subject matter, persons, settings, and
locations of patented innovation have changed over the last century, with a focus on the last four
decades. As described in the paragraphs below, it finds that patented innovation has become
more corporate, foreign, metropolitan, coastal, information technology-based, ethnically diverse,
and conversely, less likely to center on traditional manufacturing fields like mechanical
engineering or chemicals or to be performed outside of corporation, well as less likely to be
domestic.
Rather than telling a single story about American innovation, these trends support
contrasting narratives about this era - one about the prosperity of United States and its leadership
in the digital revolution to the point where “software is eating the world,”32 and another about the
relative decline of American manufacturing and native born inventors, in favor of immigrant and
offshore innovators and high-tech companies. In other words, the patent record supports two
contrasting, and somewhat conflicting narratives, one about the growth of the (innovation) pie,
and another about the declining share of the pie reserved to domestic and other participants.
A. “An Animal Trap” (issued in 1896)
Nearly 9 million patents and over 100 years before the Oracle database patent described
at the beginning of this article was granted, in 1894, the Patent Office issued patent 528,671 over

28

Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from
Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 O.J. ECON. 519, 521 (2016).
29
Id. at 553.
30
Enrico Berkes & Ruben Gaetani, Income Segregation and Rise of the Knowledge Economy 1 (Jan. 2, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) available at
https://sites.northwestern.edu/eberkes/files/2016/08/Berkes_Gaetani_Segregation_November2_2017-1nn4kei.pdf
31
Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1661, 1661 (1990).
32
In the words of venture capitalist Marc Andreesen. See Marc Andreesen, Why Software Is Eating the World,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2011, at ___.
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an “Animal Trap.”33 The purpose of the invention was to provide a simple and inexpensive
contraption for catching rats and mice. By its own description, the ‘671 patent advanced the art
of rodent capture through a construction process that made the trap both particularly sensitive
and particularly inconspicuous.34 The Animal Trap patent named just one inventor, William C.
Hooker, who, like the vast majority of patentees at the time, invented independently.35 Hooker
was from Illinois, which was among the states with the greatest number of patents, the host of
the 1893 World Fair in Chicago, and part of the second most innovative region in the country at
the time, the Midwest region.36
In the 1890s, inventing was concentrated in the Northeast, and in particular, in states like
New York and Illinois,37 while states in the South were underrepresented in patent counts,
relative to their population.38 Like the majority of other patents from the turn of the 20th century,
the “Animal Trap” was mechanical in nature; the largest single sub-category of patents from this
era was transportation.39 Hooker’s hometown of Abingdon, Illinois had a population of 1,321
people in 1890, a number that had grown to only 3,226 by the time of the 2013 census, down
10.7% from its population in 2000.40 But like other inventors that did not live in cities or near the
Patent Office, Hooker had the option of filing for his patent by mail.41 This and other unique
features of the United States patent system supporting broad-based participation in innovation
may partly explain why, based on her study of British and American innovations at world fairs
between 1851 and 1915, Moser found that there was a large disparity between urban and rural
patenting rates in Britain, but no systematic difference in patenting rates between urban and rural
areas in the US.42
B. Gore-Tex (issued in 1976)
In the 80 years that elapsed between the grant of Hooker’s “Mouse Trap” and Patent
3,953,566 on April 27, 1976 to Robert Gore, patented innovation underwent a number of shifts.
33

Animal-trap, U.S. Patent No. 528,671 (filed Mar. 14, 1894) (issued Nov. 6, 1894).
Id. (describing as the purpose of the invention, to provide “a simple, inexpensive and efficient trap adapted not to
excite the suspicion of an animal.”)
35
Colleen V. Chien, Innovators, (Santa Clara Law Working Paper 2018), fig. 3D, available at
https://www.dropbox.com/s/e1hjzv4uuathkop/Innovators%20Consolidated%2011_14%20for%20Distro.docx?dl=0;
accord Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., The Reorganization of Inventive Activity in the United States During the Early
Twentieth Century 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15440, 2009) (showing that 71% of
patents were not assigned in 1890-1891).
36
B. Zᴏʀɪɴᴀ Kʜᴀɴ, Tʜᴇ Dᴇᴍᴏᴄʀᴀᴛɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴏꜰ Iɴᴠᴇɴᴛɪᴏɴ: Pᴀᴛᴇɴᴛs ᴀɴᴅ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛꜱ ɪɴ Aᴍᴇʀɪᴄᴀɴ
Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ, 1790-1920 189 tbl.7.1 (2009).
37
In 1973, the states that received the most utility patents were New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Ohio, and
Illinois. See Appendix A.
38
Kʜᴀɴ, supra note ___, at 189 tbl.7.1.
39
Author’s analysis based on Innography patent data (showing that of the 35 WIPO subsector groups, the greatest
share of patents in 1898, 13%, were related to transportation).
40
CITY-DATA, ABINGDON, ILLINOIS, http://www.city-data.com/city/Abingdon-Illinois.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2017).
41
Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation in Economic History, 8 ANN. REV. OF ECON. 241, 11 (2016).
42
Petra Moser, Innovation Without Patents: Evidence from World's Fairs, 55 J. L. & ECON. 43, 55 (2012).
34
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Perhaps the most dramatic was the transition from what Mokyr has called “the golden age of
inventing,”43 particularly by independent inventors, in favor of R&D performed in large,
corporate labs. Driven by a number of factors,44 the “corporatization” of inventing led to the
decline in the independent share from over 80% to less than 20% in 1976. 45 As was
commonplace of the time, the ’566 patent was assigned upon issuance, to the W.L. Gore and
Associates corporation. It and several other patents formed the core of the firm’s “Gore-Tex”
empire.
Not only where inventions were developed but what technology areas they covered had
also shifted. From the mid-1890s to the mid-1950s, “mechanical engineering” inventions
dominated, consistently capturing the majority of new patents.46 But by the mid-1970’s, after a
gradual but steady decline in the share of mechanical engineering patents, chemical patents were
dominant. Gore’s patent was a good example, covering a process for making a form of
polytetraflourothylene, a polymer exceptional for being both highly porous and very strong.
Although the ’566 patent did not name Gore’s father, Wilbert Gore, it cited him, and his earlier
patent47 which also was related to chemical polymers. Wilbert had been a career chemist at
DuPont and left the company to start Gore and Associates with his wife, Vivien.48 Robert, by
then a sophomore in college, came up with the idea for Gore-Tex based on his visits down to his
father’s garage lab.49
C. Database Automation (issued in 2015)

Merritt Roel Smith et al., Historical Perspective on Invention & Creativity, 2003 Lᴇᴍᴇʟꜱᴏɴ-MIT Pʀᴏɢʀᴀᴍꜱ
Pʀᴏᴄ. 1, 18.
44
For example, the growth of complex engineering systems, and the rise of portfolio patenting enabled by the
Supreme Court’s confirmation of a lack of a requirement that patents be practiced, as described, e.g., in Robert
Merges, 100 Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2221 (2000).
45
Chien, Innovators, supra note ____, fig.3D.
46
Id. at Appendix, fig.A1.
47
Sealing Material, U.S. Patent No. 3,664,915 (filed Oct. 3, 1969) (issued May 23, 1972).
48
Sᴄᴏᴛᴛ SNELL ET AL., MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES 54 (17th ed. 2016).
49
Robert W. Gore, SCI. HIST. INST., https://www.sciencehistory.org/historical-profile/robert-w-gore (last visited Feb.
7, 2018).
43
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Fig. 1A: Patent Grant Shares by Technology Area

Data Source: USPTO PatentsView, Author’s calculations50
By the time the ’944 “Database Automation” patent was granted to Oracle, four decades
after the Gore-Tex patent, digitization, globalization, and migration had all made indelible marks
on the patent record. The introduction of inventions like the microprocessor,51 email, global
positioning system (GPS), and personal computer in the 1970s52 laid the foundation for decades
to come. “Electrical engineering” inventions53 such as the ’944 patent, represented only 20% of
new patents in the mid-1970’s but 52% of new patents in 2015. (FIG. 1A) Software-based
innovation has gone on to dominate not just the “tech” sector, but new product features in a
variety of traditional manufacturing sectors.54
Not only did the subject matter of the ’944 patent, but the number of inventors and their
locations reflected new norms. The “Mouse Trap” and Gore-Tex patents each named a single
inventor, the Oracle patent named nine.55 By 2013 patents with more than three inventors had
risen to nearly half, and only a third of patents named a lone inventor.56 Patents not assigned to a
50

USPTO PATENTSVIEW database, available at http://www.patentsview.org. Classes calculated based on matching
the first IPC/CPC to the categories (and excluding “other” non-categorized patents) defined by Ulrich Schmoch,
Concept of a Technology Classification for Country Comparisons: Final Report to the World Intellectual Property
Organisation (WIPO) 9 tbl.2 (2008).
51
Computing Systems CPU, U.S. Patent No. 3,757,306 (filed Aug. 31, 1971) (issued Sep. 4, 1973).
52
GPS Tracking System, U.S. Patent No. 5,379,224 (filed Nov. 29, 1991) (issued Jan. 3, 1995); Personal Computer,
U.S. Patent No. D268,584 (filed Nov. 3, 1980) (issued Apr. 12, 1983).
53
A category that WIPO defines as including digital communications, computer technology, communications
processes, telecommunications, and semiconductors. See Schmoch, supra note ___, at 9..
54
Lee G. Branstetter et al., Get with the Program: Software-Driven Innovation in Traditional Manufacturing 1
(Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21752, 2015).
55
‘944 Patent, supra note ___ .
56
Dennis Crouch, Inventor Count, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 13, 2013),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/inventors.html. See also Benjamin F. Jones, The Burden of Knowledge and the
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corporation had become even more of a rarity, representing less than five percent of new patents
in 2015.57
All nine Oracle inventors were from California, the top state for new patent grants since
58
1976. While the share of patents issued to the top state hovered around 13-20% for most of the
decades between 1896 and 1976,59 in the first half of 2016, Californians were granted nearly
30% of new patents (Appendix, Table 1) even though the state only had 12 percent of the
population.60 But while California’s per capita inventing is more than double the national
average, within the state, the San Francisco Bay Area dominates. In 2008, this region generated
16% of the nation’s patents, up from 4% in 1976, though its share of the national population
during this time remained constant at 2.6%.61 That’s a patenting rate six times the national
average.
Also reflective of recent trends, a large share of the inventors on the Oracle patent appear
to be of Indian descent,62 several emigrating from India.63 Using ethnic name registries
developed by marketing firms to carry out demographic targeting, Kerr and his colleagues have
traced how shares of ethnic inventors, in particular Indian and Chinese inventors, increased
dramatically over the period of 1975 to 2004, from under 2% to 6% and 9%, respectively.64
While these totals reflect inventorship, a parallel process of diversification can be seen in
ownership. Following several decades of growth in the non-US share of new patent owners,
beginning in 2009, more new patents have gone to foreign than domestic grantees.65
In the United States, the locus of inventing has also shifted over time. In 1873 the states
with the highest patents per capita were all inland states; North Dakota and Montana, followed
“Death of the Renaissance Man”: Is Innovation Getting Harder?, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 283, 316 (2009); Dennis
Crouch, The Changing Nature Inventing: Collaborative Inventing, PATENTLY-O (July 9, 2009) (showing a rise in
the average number of patents from 1.5 in 1975 to 2.3 in 2000), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/07/the-changingnature-inventing-collaborative-inventing.html.
57
Chien, Innovators, supra note ___, fig. 3D.
58
See Appendix Table 1. Accord USPTO Patent Counts By Country, State, and Year - Utility Patents (1963–Dec.
2015), available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_utl.htm.
59
Over this near century, the only data point outside of this range was in 1936, when 24% of patents of new grants
were captured by New York, based on looking at all patents issued in May and June of that year. Author’s analysis
based on data provided by Innography.
60
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NAT’L. POPULATION TOOLS TABLE,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/nation-total.html (last visited May 14, 2017). In the first half
of 2016, California had an estimated population of 39,250,017. At the same time, the United States had an estimated
population of 323,127,513..
61
Chris Forman et al., Agglomeration of Invention in the Bay Area: Not Just ICT, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 146, 146 n.1
(2016).
62
Including Amit Ganesh, Vineet Marwah, Anindya C. Patthak, Shasank K. Chavan, and Manosiz Bhattacharyya.
‘944 Patent, supra note __.
63
See Amit Ganesh, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/amit-ganesh-a5692a (last visited Jan. 27, 2017)
(showing that one “Amit Ganesh” from Oracle was educated in India).
64
William R. Kerr, U.S. High-Skilled Immigration, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Empirical Approaches and
Evidence 5 n.4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19377, 2013) (citing numerous studies). In
related work, Kerr and co-authors have found that the quality of patents by ethnic inventors is comparable to the
quality of Anglo-Saxon inventors. Id. at 7.
65
Chien, Innovators, supra note ___, fig.3F.
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by Washington DC, Connecticut and Massachusetts. In 1976, the states with the highest grant
densities were Pennsylvania, New Jersey and California, all states on the coast. In that year, five
of the top five66 and eight of the top 10 states67 were coastal states. (Appendix, Table 1). By
2016, nine out of ten were.68 (Appendix, Table 1).
What has made certain geographies more innovative than others? Universities have been
important drivers – in 2015, 8 of the 10 states with the highest per capita patent grant densities –
California, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Texas, Georgia, New Jersey, Maryland –
were among the states with the most universities, colleges, and institutes of higher learning.69
While most of these states are among the largest, others are not – Connecticut and Iowa, which
are in the bottom half of states by population,70 have some of the highest grants per capita,
boosted by the performance of their institutes of higher learning.71 And thus, while the numbers
of patents granted to universities is relatively low,72 the importance of colleges and universities
to local innovation is much, much higher.73
Innovation has also become more urban. In contrast to the finding reported earlier that in
the early 1900s that there was not a noticeable difference in patenting between US urban and
rural areas,74 now the difference could not be much starker. In 2015, 96% of domestic patents
named as their first inventor someone from a high- population density metropolitan statistical
area (MSA), reflecting a consistent year over year rise since the year 2000.75 Less than 5% of
2015 patents had a lead inventor from a non-metropolitan area.76
By itself, the finding that innovation is increasingly clustering in coastal, urban, and
university locations might not be too surprising. To a large extent, urbanization in patenting
mirrors the broader demographic shifts of individuals to metropolitan areas, which by 2010 were
home to 83% of the US population.77 In addition, for decades, scholars have observed that
industries tend to agglomerate in certain locations order to gain efficiencies in production and
66

States include California, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
States include Maryland and North Carolina.
68
States include California, North Carolina, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Texas, Georgia, and Maryland.
The only inland state in the top 10 is Iowa.
69
See Appendix, Table 1.
70
U.S. Cᴇɴꜱᴜꜱ Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜ, Pᴏᴘᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Dɪᴠɪꜱɪᴏɴ, Tᴀʙʟᴇ 1: Aɴɴᴜᴀʟ Eꜱᴛɪᴍᴀᴛᴇꜱ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Rᴇꜱɪᴅᴇɴᴛ Pᴏᴘᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ
ꜰᴏʀ ᴛʜᴇ Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇꜱ, Rᴇɢɪᴏɴꜱ, Sᴛᴀᴛᴇꜱ, ᴀɴᴅ Pᴜᴇʀᴛᴏ Rɪᴄᴏ: Aᴘʀɪʟ 1, 2010 ᴛᴏ Jᴜʟʏ 1, 2017 (NSTEST2017-01), available at https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2017/state/totals/nstest2017-01.xlsx.
71
See Appendix, Table 1.
72
About 1-2% in 2015. Author’s analysis using PATENTSVIEW, supra note ___.
73
Although not determinative; Feldmann and Kogler’s literature review, supra note ___, finds, based on reviewing
two decades of literature, that local universities are necessary but not sufficient for innovation.
74
Moser, Innovation Without Patents, supra note __, at 55.
75
Author’s calculation, based on data provided by the USPTO’s Patent Technology Monitoring Team (PTMT).
Calendar Year Patent Statistics (January 1 to December 31): General Patent Statistics Reports Available for
Viewing, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports_cbsa.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
76
Id.
77
Paul Mackun & Steven Wilson, Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010, 2010 CENSUS BRIEF (Mar.
2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf.
67
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support specialization.78 The innovative, educated people that comprise what Richard Florida
calls “the creative class,” tend to thrive in diverse, open, tolerant, and technologically advanced
environments.79 This may explain why patenting trends appear to correspond with political ones.
Fig. 1F shows a US map of patent density (based on the first inventor’s location), with counties
with three or more patents per 10K capita shaded blue, and less than three shaded red. FIG. 1G
shows a map of 2016 Presidential results by county. Counties with more patents per capita were
more likely than those with fewer patents per capita to vote Democratic. Two-thirds of the
counties by population that had a 2015 rate of patents per 10K capita of below three voted for
Trump. But of counties that had 3 or more patents per 10K capital, the opposite was true: 67% of
these counties, by population, voted for Clinton.
Fig. 1F: 2015 Patents per 10K Capita

County Patent
Density

Fig. 1G: 2016 Presidential Election Results

% Trump

% Clinton

<3 patents

66.1%

39.9%

3+ patents

32.9%

67.1%

Data Sources: USPTO,80 US Census,81 Data.world (election data),82Author’s Analysis,
Distributions calculated based on covered population in counties
Globalization has made it easier for creative, talented and diverse people to find their way
78

This literature is reviewed in, e.g., Glenn Ellison et al., What Causes Industry Agglomeration? Evidence from
Coagglomeration Patterns, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1195 (2010).
79
Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class, 2 CITY & COMMUNITY 3 (2003).
80
2015 Patent Listing by US County (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports_cbsa.htm)
81
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2017/demo/popest/counties-total.html
82
https://data.world/garyhoov/2016-pres-election-by-county
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to places like Austin, New York City, and Raleigh-Durham.83 But what happens when they do?
The patents referred to earlier provide some clues. In the case of the Oracle patent, publicly
available records suggest that although inventor Amit Ganesh originally came to the United
States to attend Stanford, he stayed in the area, to join Oracle and become a star engineer.84 He is
in a good company – research shows that ethnic inventors have played an outsized role in
patenting in places like the Bay Area and Boston, where there are large numbers of prominent
universities.85 What about when the innovator leaves for the coast, not from another country, but
from an inland, less innovative location? The innovation and talent, likewise, can go with them.
The inventor of Gore-Tex, Robert Gore moved to coastal Delaware from inland Utah, so his
father could work at DuPont. Gore established his headquarters in Delaware and has played
outsized role in the state’s economy since.86 The extent to which the clustering of innovation is
contributing to what I call a “domestic brain drain”87 of individuals from inland and rural areas to
coastal and metropolitan areas is a subject I leave for later analyses.
D. Two Stories
What is one to make of these trends in patented innovation– away from manufacturing
and towards information technology, away from domestic and towards foreign inventors and
owners, and away from broad-based and geographically distributed innovation and towards
innovation that is highly concentrated, in metropolitan areas in coastal states? The data support at
least two views. The first, more optimistic view, is focused on the idea that innovation has grown
the pie for all. The second, more pessimistic view takes the position that the innovation pie has
become increasingly unevenly distributed and centered on immigrants and coastal elites.
The topic of high-skilled immigration provides one illustration of how the same facts can
support divergent views. Consider Figs. 1B and 1C below. Fig. 1B presents shares of US
computer science graduate students from 2000-2015. US citizen and permanent resident students
are further broken into demographic groups, while temporary visa holders are tracked separately.
As the data shows, from 2000-2015, the fastest-growing group of students are temporary visa
holders while the share of white citizens and permanent resident students declined. Fig. 1C
presents a similar view, of US patents from 1980-2015, based on owner type. As the Figure
shows, from 1980-2015, the share of foreign-owned patents continued to increase, in inverse
proportion to the share of US-owned patents, while the share of US independent inventors
continued to decrease.

83

Id. at 9.
Ganesh, supra note __. From this record, it appears that Ganesh started a Ph.D, but left after one year.
85
William R. Kerr, The Agglomeration of U.S. Ethnic Inventors, in AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS 237 (Edward
Glaeser ed., 2010).
86
Beryl Lieff Benderly, DuPont Cutbacks Send a Chill through Delaware’s Science Community, SCI. AM., June 23,
2016 (describing Delaware as “virtually dominated by the DuPont corporation,” which in the 1970s and ‘80s
employed 30,000 in the state.).
87
Subject of work in progress, “The Domestic Brain Drain.”
84
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Fig. 1B: US Computer Science Graduate Students (Shares)

Data Source: National Science Foundation88
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/2/d/1FW0L6zp8iskublK59zzWjMRi-uyOE0ZE-PDpn7BMws/edit?zx=oxxxjzx950ns&usp=docs_web

88

National Science Foundation, Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering
(2017), https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/datatables/gradpostdoc/2015/#tabs-2.
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Fig. 1C: Patent Grants by Entity (Shares)

Data Source: USPTO PatentsView, Author’s calculations.
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1JxyPmBqurq0opr6K3eoD1u433IH2HSx4zUA9jA6LFU/edit?zx=5zufskv8bvjf#gid=0
What the data mean depends on who you ask. To optimists, one of innovation’s greatest
virtues is that it has attracted the “best and the brightest” from around the world to contribute to
the American economy. The growth in the shares of temporary visa holders (Fig. 1B) and foreign
corporations (Fig. 1C) are proof of this positive fact. A number of studies have found that
immigrant entrepreneurs have had an outsized impact, with 40% of Fortune 500 companies
founded by first or second-generation immigrants.89 Immigrants have also started more than half
of “unicorn” ($B+) startups, including Tesla, founded by South Africa’s Elon Musk, and PayPal,
founded by German-born Peter Thiel.90
And yet, these trends also support a much more pessimistic view, one centered on the
position of the white, native-born “American” worker relative to others. The rise in corporate and
foreign inventors (Fig. 1C) and temporary visa holder students (Fig. 1B) has been at the expense
of American independent inventors (Fig. 1C) and white students (Fig. 1B). Likewise, just as
Asian inventor shares have increased, Anglo-Saxon inventors have seen their share decline, from
90% in 1976 to 68% in 2012, Bill Kerr has found91 As jobs in innovation migrate to the coast
and areas where immigrant communities cluster, left behind are inland, patent-lagging areas. An
accounting of the costs and benefits of high-skill migrations reveal why to some this can be
89

Alice Gast, A Magic Pony and America’s Unicorns: How Immigrants Spark Innovation, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan.
17, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/a-magic-pony-and-americas-unicorns-why-we-needimmigrants-to-spark-innovation-in-business-and-science/.
90
Stuart Anderson, Immigration and Billion Dollar Startups, Nᴀᴛ’ʟ. Fᴏᴜɴᴅ. Aᴍ. Pᴏʟ’ʏ 9 (Mar. 2016).
91
Kerr, U.S. High-Skilled Immigration, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, supra note __, at 5.
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problematic. When a firm employs a high-skilled worker, both the immigrant and the employer
benefit, the former in the form of expanded opportunity and higher wages, and the latter in the
form of a greater supply of talent and skills. But there are other less obvious beneficiaries as
well. When a firm employs an immigrant, the firm benefits not only from the immigrant’s
technical talent, but the immigrant’s knowledge of her home market. Armed with this
knowledge, firms that hire immigrants are more likely to form their own subsidiaries rather than
to partner with local companies in the home countries of their employees.92 Innovators within the
immigrant’s home country appear to benefit too, as they are more likely to cite the patents of
people of their own ethnicity.93 In these ways, innovation by immigrants has spillover effects that
buoy the company, the immigrant, and innovators within the immigrant’s home country.94
But when these parties gain, some segment of domestic workers arguably lose, because
the company can get away with paying less than if the labor market were tighter. There is also
less pressure on firms and the education system to invest in local educational programs and
develop domestic workers when foreign skills can be imported to fill the void. When strong
promotion of liberal immigration policies by the technology community prevents wages from
rising despite the increasing demand for skills,95 to a cynic, this provides further evidence of
companies putting their own self-interest, and the interests of immigrants, above the interests of
native-born citizens.
One way to determine who is right, or, that is, whether immigrants have substituted for,
rather than complemented domestic innovators, is to look at absolute rather than relative growth.
Analyzing national origin data and patent counts from 1930 to 2000, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle
attempted to measure the net impact of immigration on the economy. They found that a one
percentage point increase in immigrant college graduates resulted in 9-18% more patents per
capita, benefiting the whole economy.96 What about the impact on domestic local workers?
Research suggest that native patenting does not suffer when H1-B workers patent, but instead
increases to a small degree, particularly when immigrants are from India and China.97 Based on
absolute, not relative, numbers, as shown in Figs. 1D and 1E, independent inventor and white
American graduate student counts haven’t declined in number, it’s just that the growth in
temporary visa holders and corporate inventors (both US and foreign) has far surpassed their
92

C. Fritz Foley & William R. Kerr, Ethnic Innovation and U.S. Multinational Firm Activity, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1529
(2013).
93
William R. Kerr, Ethnic Scientific Communities and International Technology Diffusion, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT.
518, 520-525 (2008) (“[R]esearchers cited researchers of their own ethnicity 30%–50% more frequently than
researchers of other ethnicities, even after controlling for detailed technology classes.”). Kerr speculates that the
same factors that drive the informal transfer of knowledge among ethnic communities, including the importance of
professional networks, word of mouth transmission of information, and “frontier expatriates” may also explain the
diffusion of information through same-ethnicity patents. Id.
94
Though the home country also suffers from brain drain, at least temporarily, with the immigrant’s relocation;
local entrepreneurs also miss the opportunity to form joint ventures with the firm.
95
Described, e.g., in Peter Cappelli, Skill Gaps, Skill Shortages and Skill Mismatches: Evidence for the U.S., (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20382, 2014) (questioning the idea of a “skills gap” and positing that
over-education is a more pressing problem than under-education).
96
Jennifer Hunt & Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation, Iɴꜱᴛ. Sᴛᴜᴅ. ᴏꜰ
Lᴀʙ. (Discussion Paper No. 3921, Jan. 2009).
97
Id. at 3.
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growth.
Fig. 1D: Computer Science Graduate Students (Absolute Values)

Data Source: National Science Foundation98

98

National Science Foundation, Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering
(2017), https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/datatables/gradpostdoc/2015/#tabs-2.
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Fig. 1E: Patent Grants by Entity (Absolute Values)

Data Source: USPTO PatentsView, Author’s calculations.
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1JxyPmBqurq0opr6K3eoD1u433IH2HSx4zUA9jA6LFU/edit?zx=t21ygy4cg79o#gid=0
Data File
E. Conclusion
In sum, then, patented innovation has changed in ways that are broadly consistent with
stories of both rising economic prosperity and rising inequality. Inventing has become more
metropolitan, more diverse, and more focused on digital, electrical engineering technologies. At
the same time, it has become coastal and international, but also, less likely to represent
innovation by American companies and Anglo-Saxon inventors. According to the optimistic
view, innovation has grown the pie, and grown it for all as immigrant innovators have
contributed to this growth in an additive, rather than zero-sum manner, bringing into the United
States skills and labor that have benefited the domestic economy. The negative perspective, on
the other hand, would stress that just as the distribution of wealth and income has become more
concentrated over the past three decades, so has the ownership and the geography of patents,
accelerating a domestic brain drain to university towns and the coasts. How can these patterns
and broader trends in inequality be reconciled? The next Part takes on this question.
Part II: A Framework for Understanding the Relationship between Innovation, Inequality,
and Intellectual Property
The previous Part explored trends in patented innovation and their striking, although
perhaps not too surprising, consistency with broader social and economic trends. However, it did
not broach how innovation does or does not contribute to inequality. This topic, and the
contribution of intellectual property, have been part of a number of important but to date largely
18
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separate conversations, for example, about the misallocation of resources to talent,99drug prices,
and the increasing dominance of elite technology firms100 Their collective upshot is to suggest
that, left alone, current market and institutional arrangements will not necessarily achieve the
socially optimal creation or distribution of innovation. However, no theory exists for unifying
disparate studies of innovation and intellectual property, or for developing interventions that are
systematically informed by them.
This Part attempts to begin to address this void by offering a framework for explaining
the relationship between innovation, inequality, and intellectual property that draws from various
economic, legal, philosophical and other accounts. How any particular innovation impacts
inequality depends on a complex set of institutional, social, and technical factors. However,
several specific dynamics, I argue, tend to dominate the relationship between innovation and
inequality. First, innovation can increase inequality by increasing returns to scarce “innovation
capital,” relative to labor including intellectual property, innovation talent, skills and
commercialization potential, and other innovation assets, enriching those with innovation capital
relative to those without it. Second, innovation can reduce inequality by boosting social mobility,
the diffusion of new goods and services (which can be retarded or hastened by intellectual
property), and in some cases by complementing, rather than substituting for low-skilled workers.
These mechanisms, in turn can be retarded or hastened by intellectual property. Third, that
inclusion in innovation is a critical input into whether one or another of these mechanisms
dominates, and the long-term impacts of innovation. As such, this framework attempts to
integrate disparate perspectives about innovation, inequality, intellectual property, and inclusion
and the threads that hold them together.
Economic inequality is an umbrella concept that refers to the dispersion of an asset or
liability, usually income, wealth, or consumption,101 among individuals or firms. In the context
of innovation, much can be gained by further distinguishing between producer inequality, the
distribution of rents and wages among productive firms and individuals, including those that do
and do not innovate, and consumption inequality, the distribution of innovative consumer goods
and services developed for and disseminated to consumers. When poor patients cannot access the
same medicines rich patients can because they are too expensive, for example, consumption
inequality is a culprit. The growth in CEO salaries relative to ordinary wages,102 on the other
hand, contributes to producer inequality. Within each type of inequality, further distinctions can
be made between inequality dynamics that impact firms and individuals at the very top (top-

99

Discussed, e.g., by Murat Celik, Does the Cream Always Rise to the Top? The Misallocation of Talent in
Innovation (Nov. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.tsefr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/sem2016/jobmarket/jmp_celik.pdf.
100
Described supra notes ____.
101
Income inequality, which pertains to an individual’s distribution of income, is a concept that distinct from wealth
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income inequality) versus those that are felt more generally. The sections below distinguish
between producer and consumption, and top income and general inequality.
A. How Innovation Can Increase Inequality
In his nearly 600-page tome Capital, Piketty refers to a simple heuristic to explain why
inequality has risen: R>g, where R is equal to the rate of growth of capital and g is equal to the
rate of growth of the economy. As long as returns to capital are greater than returns to growth,
the gap between capital and labor will grow. Capital is a massive concept that includes physical
and “immaterial” capital including not only patents, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual
property103 but also other forms of “innovation capital” including scientific and technical
educational attainment, institutions, skills, data, and talent.104 As returns to innovation capital
increase relative to growth, so does the gap between those with and without innovation capital,
holding all else equal.
1. Among Producers
It is not difficult to think of examples of the "rich getting richer” among producers of
innovation. As described belows, individuals like Keith Ellison, firms like Facebook, and certain
sectors of economy like tech and pharma - all of which have greater shares of various innovation
capital than others - have pulled away from others in recent years. The enrichment of those with
innovation assets relative to those without such assets has an inequality exacerbating impact.
a. Through Sorting and Segregation
The most striking evidence that innovation has contributed to making the very rich richer
is presented by Aghion and his co-authors. Matching patenting and commuting zone income data
from 1980 to 2005, the researchers find a causal relationship between growing patent intensity
and inequality, attributing 17%, of the total increase in the share of income held by the top 1% to
innovation. This elite segment of society has been able to use their capital to create patented
technology that has reduced the need for labor,105 and increased their returns to capital. As the
individuals at the helm of such companes capture an increasing share of income, the workers’

Tʜᴏᴍᴀꜱ Pɪᴋᴇᴛᴛʏ, Cᴀᴘɪᴛᴀʟ: ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Tᴡᴇɴᴛʏ-Fɪʀꜱᴛ Cᴇɴᴛᴜʀʏ 49 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press
of Harv. Univ. Press 2014) (2013) (further counting patents that an individual holds directly as nonfinancial
assets and patents that are held by a corporation that an individual holds shares in as financial assets).
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share of income decreases.106
The research suggests that a similar mechanism tied to the unequal distribution of another
scarce form of innovation capital – talent– is leading to greater segregation, not only among
individuals, but firms.107 Though inequality has largely been cast in terms of the growing gap
between rich individuals and others, research suggests that the difference between prosperous
and less prosperous firms is actually more to blame.108 The real culprit behind rising inequality is
not the rising pay of CEOs or super managers, but the rapid increase in the wages of average
employees at firms employing individuals at the top of the income distribution, relative to the
relatively stagnant wages among firms in the lower percentiles.109 Over the last two decades, a
striking 75% of US industries have experienced increasing concentration.110 This stratifies intercompany incomes, to greater effect than differences in intra-company incomes. This corporate
segregation is accelerated by growing investments in technology, particularly automation, and
the outsourcing of non-core functions.111 Funds reserved for knowledge workers are used to
attract the best-educated and most-skilled employees, which in turn leads to clustering within the
most successful companies.112
Though not the only example of “winner take all” dynamics,113 the domination of the
tech industry by a handful of companies to many provides the clearest example. Though
relatively young in age, these large companies (including Facebook, Amazon, Google and
Apple) have several things going for them. First, they leverage network effects that make a
product or service more valuable the more people use it.114 The more users that are on Facebook
or any particular social media platform, for example, the greater its reach, and by extension, its
value. More users also mean more data, which provides a proprietary advantage when it comes
to computational techniques for improving internal operations, marketing, and sales. Companies
that use software provide platform services that connect buyers and sellers are also poised to
grow their business and revenue rapidly without significant increases in headcount – in other
106
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Bloom, supra note __.
112
Id.
113
Two decades ago in 1997, the share of public company revenue captured by the top four real estate firms was
49%. By 2014, they were responsible for 78% of public company revenue. Grullon et al., supra note _, at 14. In the
sunglass market, a single firm has an estimated 60% share. Dennis Green & Anaele Pelisson, 2 Companies Control
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words, they “scale.”115 Perhaps most importantly, the most talented people want to work for the
same cluster of dynamic firms, leaving less talent for others, the research suggests.116
The geographic agglomeration of talent is not a new phenomenon. However, in the face
of rapid growth, innovation is driving segregation, Berkes and Gaetani have found.117 They
estimate that their research, the innovation intensity of a city, as represented by patent citations,
is responsible for some 20% of the overall increase in urban segregation in the city between 1990
and 2010. 118 Because knowledge workers and the members of the creative class are mobile and
care about hyperlocal traits like the quality of schooling and social relationships, they end up
clustering with each other.119
But while segregation, and the sorting of talented workers into elite firms may be an
unintended side effect of increasing innovation intensity, the pulling away by market leaders in
diverse fields is much more deliberate, according to political scientists and populists. At the core
of accounts about the “rigged system” is the golden rule: he who has the gold writes the rules.
Economic inequality translates into political inequality which in turn, creates more economic
inequality.120
b. Through A Rigged System: Through Lobbying
In The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and
European Politics,121 Judis distinguishes between several strains of populism. Right-wing
populists decry liberal elites and the groups they favor, including immigrants, the poor, and
minorities.122 Left-wing populists vilify corporations and the prioritization of the needs and the
desires of the 1% over those of the 99%.123 While right-wing populism is triadic, pitting the
people against left-wing elites as well as the groups that they have (from the perspective of right
wing populists) artificially propped up, left-wing populism is more binary - the people vs. the
elite establishment. Both types distrust and rail against the cozy relationships between
policymakers and the lobbies of the rich and powerful, but to very different ends - for right wing
populists, in order to stem and even reverse the flow of globalization and immigration, and for
left wing populists, in order to reduce the influence of corporate interests and increase
progressive governmental interventions.124
Although innovative firms are not the only firms that lobby, lobbying appears to also
have made a sizeable contribution to innovation-driven inequality. Based on a novel study of
115
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innovation and inequality based on patent, IRS, and lobbying databases covering 1980 to 2005,
Aghion and his colleagues found lobbying to be negatively correlated with a particular kind of
innovation, entrant innovation.125 Related, while intellectual property is only one of many
possible areas of lobbying, Baker blames the growth of patent and copyright-related rents from
1980–2015 as one of the primary contributors to the upwards redistribution of income.126 While
his study fails to precisely quantify the specific contribution of these factors to inequality, it is
true that over this period, the duration of both copyright127 and the number of patents128
dramatically increased. These studies are consistent with the idea that as powerful firms invest in
lobbying and political influence, they shape the system to best preserve their dominant positions.
Many versions of this story have been told within intellectual property circles, also consistent
with at least two populist visions.
On the left are political scientists, public interest and human rights groups, and consumer
and health advocates who decry the manipulation by pharmaceutical and content industries of the
rules of international intellectual property law to their advantage, at the expense of patients,
consumers and minority groups.129 Kaminski has argued that corporations have captured
regulators like the United States Trade Representative to such a degree that the regulators
negotiate in favor of private industry and against the public good.130 International intellectual
property provisions negotiated with a lack of transparency have so undermined the public trust
and public interest that even when they are enacted into law, they lack legitimacy131 and are seen
as the outputs of an unjust and undemocratic process.
The pharmaceutical industry has been singled out for making US drugs prices the highest
in the world.132 Each year the industry pours more resources than any other into lobbying,133
125
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eliciting counter movements, in the international intellectual property realm, in favor of greater
flexibilities and substantive equality in trade laws.134 However, pharma and the content industry
are not the only industries that have been criticized for their extensive lobbying efforts. While
somewhat less developed than “left wing” populist critiques of the patent system, “right wing”
populist views have also been advanced. According to this view, large technology companies
cultivate cozy relationships with Washington to advance an agenda of “disadvantag[ing] artists
and creators”135 in the copyright realm and “efficient infringement”136 of patents. The latter
phenomenon occurs when companies purposely infringe patents because they believe the
benefits of infringing outweigh the costs associated with getting caught.137
Somewhere between these two poles is a long history of claims and evidence that the
intellectual property system, in fact, is rigged in favor of dominant groups and countermeasures
to reverse this trend. For years, powerful stakeholders have lobbied for – and received –
extensions to the durations of their intellectual property. The Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 is referred to some as the “Mickey Mouse Act” because of the role of Disney in securing its
passage to prevent characters like Mickey Mouse from entering the public domain,138 and is just
one of a dozen or so extensions passed in the twentieth century.139 Individual patent owners have
lobbied Congress for centuries to get special private extensions to extend the terms of their
patents.140 In one notorious case from 1872, Congress granted a patent on an already existing
technology for sewing machines to the Singer Sewing Machine corporation, angering farmers
that could no longer buy competing machines at half the price.141 Already feeling oppressed by
patent campaigns levied by patent “sharks” that bought patents and used them to sue, farmers,
acting through the “National Grange,” turned patent extensions into an election issue and
translated this pressure into the rejection of virtually every extension proposed during the 1874
term.142
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The upset associated with this sort of patent “bullying,” has also seeded one of the most
important political movements in recent US history, the funding of the right-wing and Tea Party
by Charles and David Koch, also known as the “Koch brothers.” When the boys were young,
father Fred’s oil and gas business was almost sued out of existence for patent infringement by it
and its customers by large companies who were helped in their campaign with compromised
judges.143 As described in the book Dark Money, this incident was one that Fred would “later tell
his sons bitterly and often,” and his resistance to their tactics was “an early version of the Kochs’
later opposition to ‘corporate cronyism’ in which they contend government and big business
collaborate unfairly.”144 Suits by large patent holders against small company defendants145 can
be motivated by a number of anticompetitive desires. In response to a survey about patent
litigation conducted among venture capitalists, for example, a number of respondents cited
several objectives including, “[b]ig company scorched earth tactics … [meant to] scare a smaller
company and make it hard to raise funding,” to “drain the start-up of cash to remove a
competitor,” “to squash a thinly funded competitor,” and “to shut [the] company down.”146
c. Through A Rigged System (II): Innovation Through Privilege and
Credentialing
Yet the perception and reality that the system is rigged in favor of the powerful is not
only true of firms, but also individuals. Recent work by Chetty and his colleagues have
documented the much lower rates of inventing by children with talent but without privilege –
because they are girls, black or brown, or lack parents who are innovators or within a top income
bracket.147 Their results are surprising and profoundly challenging to those who believe that
innovation operates as a meritocracy. However, in context, they are also nothing new. From 1790
to the mid-20th century, free white persons could patent, but others were limited in their rights to
do so.148 The ability of married women to patent was only confirmed in 1883.149 In 2015,
143
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American women represented an estimated 18% of all inventors named on US patents,150 and
according to a survey conducted by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation,
only half a percent of U.S.-born innovators are African American, despite a 13% share of the
population.151 The current underrepresentation of women and black minority inventors from
patenting could be said to stem from the institutional exclusion of these populations dating back
to the turn of the 18th century.
Just as some groups have suffered from systemic disadvantages in innovation, others
have enjoyed built-in advantages. Like other professions passed down between generations,152 a
culture of inventing and patenting is a form of inheritance. In studying great inventors from the
1790s to the 1860s, Zorina Khan found that “eight of [] [] nine machinist/inventor fathers had
sons in the same profession.”153 A more systematic study of the “golden age” of inventing from
1880 to 1940 by Akcigit found a positive correlation between having a father who was an
inventor and parental income on one hand and the likelihood of patenting on the other. 154
Against this backdrop, the finding that the chance a child will patent increases dramatically if she
comes from a wealthy or inventor family,155 even controlling for differences in ability,156 is
unsurprising. Like other forms of capital, the know-how and resources needed to invent, it
appears, comprise yet another form of “innovation capital” that is both scarce and distributed
unevenly throughout society. Related research suggests that the probability of accessing the
training needed to become an inventor are also redistributed unevenly, in a way that exacerbates
inequality.157
The implications of the studies described in this and the previous subsections are clear:
the innovation system is rigged in favor of those with resources – whether companies, family
wealth or inheritance- and against those without them.
d. Through Intellectual-Property Based Tax Avoidance
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Although large corporations collectively are part of the 1% against which populists rail,
intellectual property-centric firms have been singled out for having an easier time capturing
rents. As Schwartz has documented, profits as a share of sales from pharmaceutical, software and
programming, computer hardware and computer services industries are greater than for other
major industries including utilities, conglomerates, oil and gas operations, and banks.158 In
addition, while all firms seek to reduce their tax burdens,159 IP assets are more portable than
physical assets like plants, which need to be physically proximate to skilled labor or markets.160
The uniqueness of each patent or copyright makes it difficult to value, allowing multinationals to
make the adjustments they need to pay the least amount of tax.161 These two characteristics,
Andrew Blair-Stanek has argued, make intellectual property “ideal for avoiding tax.”162 As such,
intellectual property, combined with size, can make it not only easier to capture rents, but to hold
on to them.
2. Among Consumers
Innovation can increase not only production inequality, but also the gap between what
rich and poor consumers pay for goods, or consumption inequality.163 The subsection below
discusses two mechanisms - underinvestment in the problems of the poor, and also reduced
competition due to intellectual property - by which this can take place.
a. Through Relative Underinvestment in Problems of the Poor and Relative
Overinvestment in Problems of the Rich
According to Hayek, the reason that inequality spurs innovation is because the rich can
afford to buy luxuries and experiment with new and novel products and ways of living.
Innovators, in turn, “cater[] to the rich,” at least initially.164 This explains why there are more
food delivery than food stamp startups, and why there is more innovation in premium craft beer
than in beers like Budweiser 165 that are consumed by the masses. To take two extremes: first, so
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little commercial pharmaceutical attention is devoted to the tropical diseases that impact
impoverished populations that they are called “neglected.”166 Second, that so much money in
Silicon Valley is going to the imaginary problems of the rich that Juicero, maker of $400
machines as effective as two hands for squeezing juice, raised $120M before shutting down
following much ridicule. 167
Underinvestment in the problems of the poor (tropical diseases) and overinvestment in
the problems of the rich (Juicero) can in turn be spurred by the growth in inequality in the first
place. Based on an analysis of bar-code scanner data, Jaravel finds, surprisingly, that from 2004
to 2013, the rich experienced larger increases in product variety and smaller increases in prices
than did the poor.168 Why would this be the case? Because a rise in inequality has resulted in
more affluent consumers, which in turn has encouraged the development of new products for the
rich; so much so, that, in turn, competition has reduced the prices of premium vs. unbranded
goods.169 While it’s doubtful that all or even the majority of upper class expenditures have gone
down relative to lower class expenditures, the observed dynamic is nonetheless noteworthy.
b. Through Reduced Competition
When products crossover, rather than being designed primarily for one segment of the
population, they can still be priced out of reach for poor consumers. For many years, AIDS drugs
were out of the reach of consumers in sub-saharan Africa because they were patented and only
available at monopoly prices. But unpredictable demand, delivery, and distribution channels, and
a host of other factors relating to a lack of a thick market can also reduce competition in
innovative goods and services for the poor or where the market is small. Martin Shkrekli, a
hedge fund manager disgraced for changing the price overnight of Darapim, which affects AIDS
patients, from $13.50 to seven hundred and fifty dollars a pill, could do so not because it was on
patent – it wasn’t – but because of a lack of competition in providing the drug.170
B. How Innovation Can Decrease Inequality
Although the previous subsection described various ways in which innovation has, over
the past few decades, resulted in higher returns to innovation capital and skills, this dynamic is
not inevitable. In fact, economic historians recounting evidence from the first industrial
revolution have described the replacement of the work of skilled textile artisans by factory
outputs as biased but in the opposite direction and “unskilled biased” or skilled-worker
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replacing.171 As described in a White House report, skilled artisans that managed full production
processes “saw their livelihoods threatened by the rise of mass production technologies” that
replaced the craftsmen with assembly line processes featuring “interchangeable parts and lowerskilled workers.”172 Technology complemented lower-skill workers, but substituted for higherskill ones.
The impact of artificial intelligence on workforce productivity is also predicted to be
uneven, although its net impact is likely to more closely resemble the last four decades than the
first industrial revolution. Autonomous vehicle technology that allows cars to drive themselves
for long distances is predicted to impact up to one in nine (15.5M) workers.173 It is likely to
significantly shrink the demand for long-haul truckers, whose median salary in 2016 was about
$41,000 a year.174 Advances in image detection and machine learning are expected to also
profoundly impact and potentially reduce the need for radiologists. As computers get better at
tasks like detecting, measuring, and characterizing images, including images of human tissue, for
the presence of cancer175 it will be harder to justify paying doctor salaries with a median value in
2016 of over $208,000176 for those services.
Complementing the previous section, which discusses mechanisms by which innovation
can increase inequality, the following subsections discuss mechanisms by which innovation can
decrease it.
1. Among Producers
a. By Fostering Growth and Social Mobility
One mechanism by which innovation can reduce inequality is by fostering growth and
promoting social mobility. It is received wisdom for example, that, over history, innovative
activity has been the main driver of long-term growth and well-being.177 In the past few decades,
digital technologies have produced advances that, in accordance with the process of creative
destruction described by Schumpeter,178 “strike not only at the margins of the profits and outputs
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of existing firms, but at their foundation and very lives.”179 As new technologies replace old
technologies and the wealth of new entrepreneurs replaces the wealth of the old incumbents.
Larry Ellison was not born with the wealth he enjoys today, and his success is shared to some
degrees by his colleagues. Many of today’s tech’s billionaires did not inherit their wealth, but
made it themselves.180 Social mobility is boosted when innovation by entrants disrupts the
existing distribution of welfare. In addition, innovation makes workers more productive, leading
to sustained gains that grow the economy.
This may explain in part why even though patenting has been found to be correlated with
top income inequality, no such correlation has been found between patenting and other forms of
inequality, e.g. decile inequality. More strikingly, innovation by new entrants has not only not
been not found to be associated with general inequality but it has been found to be positively
associated with social mobility.181 Said more plainly – while patented innovation apparently
makes the very rich richer, thereby increasing top income inequality, innovation from new
entrants is associated with decreasing general inequality. Consider the microcosm of California.
In California, the very rich owe much to innovation, where 30% of the increase in the top 1%
income share is due to innovation according to Aghion’s study.182 But in California, social
mobility is also high, “much higher than those in the least innovative state,” likely thanks again,
at least in part, to patented innovation.183
b. Through Intellectual Property, By Supporting Individual Inventors and Creators
Just as innovation can reduce inequality by supporting wealth transfers to entrants from
incumbents, it can also, through intellectual property, facilitate transfers to those with talent but
not capital. Easier to transact in than trade secrets, patent and copyright provide enforceable
rights that give creators the confidence to engage in negotiations without fear of being ripped off,
thereby resolving the “Arrow information paradox.”184 In the early patent system, the sale of
one’s patent was a key way that inventors got paid.185 Entities that cannot themselves
commercialize the technologies they develop, such as independent inventors and universities,
rely on licensing to develop and disseminate products. Indeed, licenses from universities and
other research entities have seeded many of the therapeutic and drug innovations developed by
the biotechnology industry.186
179
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In a similar vein, for a startup that is geographically isolated, it may be easier to get a
patent than to break into a relevant social network or tap into a pipeline of talent from a local
university. When young companies lack a proven track record, revenue stream, or vetted model,
a patent can distinguish. When startups obtain patents, it helps them, Farre-Mesna and his
colleagues found, “create jobs, grow their sales, innovate, and reward their investors.”187 Patents
can set young firms apart from others, both as a signal of novelty and nonobviousness, and as a
potential source of exclusivity.
Copyright, Merges and Hughes have argued, performs a similar function by being one of
the few ways in which creators are able to transform their labor into capital,188 and therefore to
enrich themselves materially based only on their own efforts and potentially, creativity. To the
extent that creators want freedom, credit, and control,189 copyright can potentially give it to them,
through royalties that can allow authors to support themselves.
2. Among Consumers
Another primary mechanism by which innovation can decrease inequality is through the
dissemination of new products and services. Innovation initially enriches those at the top who
can pay for it, but the diffusion of this innovation to all at lower prices reduces inequality in the
long term as predicted by Hayek. As such, while the IT revolution may have made Larry Ellison
and his peers very rich, advances in electronics from 2000 to the present have also led to a
halving of the price of consumer electronics while increasing performance by fivefold, a tenfold
increase in purchasing power.190 Since the 1990s, the prices of most goods, other than food and
fuel, have declined, thanks to globalization as well as improvements in technology.191 Patents
can support the downstream and widespread diffusion of an innovation,192 by strengthening the
invisible hand and supporting differential pricing.
a. Through Intellectual Property Enabled Diffusion, Differential Pricing, and
Spillovers
Although patents are often blamed for keeping the costs of patented innovations like
pharmaceuticals high, a number of studies have found that they can also spur the spread of
technology by prompting the diffusion of the technology. To the extent that patents facilitate the
187
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sale of the same item at different prices for different markets, they support the more equitable
dissemination of a good, at a higher price to those who want and can afford it, and at lower
prices to lower-margin markets.193 In addition, when a patent owner feels that it can retain
sufficient profits in a new market (or that entry into that market will not cannibalize other
sources of profits), it will have a greater incentive to invest in that market. For example, based on
looking at World Fair exhibits before and after the patenting of chemicals was introduced in the
1850s, Petra Moser found that as patenting became more prevalent, inventive activity spread
geographically, leading the chemicals industry to become significantly less concentrated in a
single cluster of locations.194 Multinational firms have shown a greater willingness to transfer
technology, and to enter international markets, when patent rights are stronger. A study of
reforms that strengthened patent rights undertaken between 1982 and 1999 found that
multinationals significantly increased technology transfer to reforming countries.195 A study of
the timing of launches of 642 new drugs in 76 countries during 1983–2002 found that while price
regulation delayed entry into those countries, stronger patent rights accelerated it.196 It is not
necessarily surprising that patent rights drive entry by patent-owners, insofar as they are
associated with a lower risk of competition and a higher chance of profitability. In addition,
rights-owner driven entry is not the same thing as widespread diffusion. However, what these
findings underscore is that much depends on the design of the patent system and the context in
which it operates.
Another set of potentially broad-based benefits from innovation are its spillovers, the
uncompensated benefit transferred between innovative individuals and firms to their peers and
others.197 Take the patent system. Unlike trade shows, paid publications, and industry
conferences, patent records stored on government websites are freely and equally available to
follow-on innovators. Improvements to the public patent record benefit all, but as with all
investments in public knowledge, particularly those who do not have access to paid services.
C. The Importance of Inclusion and Integration in Innovation
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The previous subparts lay out the ways in which innovation can increase or decrease
inequality. Increasing returns to scarce innovation capital have led to sorting and segregation,
rent-seeking (lobbying and credentialing) in the form of favorable intellectual property rules, and
higher prices than if there was more competition, particularly to serve lower-income customers.
These dynamics have contributed over the past three to four decades to the widening gulf
between the ultra-elite and the rest. However, innovation can and has also led to greater social
mobility, spillovers, and, supported by intellectual property, the dissemination of goods and
services to the masses. These dynamics have played a role over the same period, decreasing the
costs of many goods and correlating to some degree to reduced general (as opposed to top)
income inequality.
Collectively, they demonstrate that no single impact of innovation on inequality is
inevitable but rather, the result of a complex set of institutional, social, and technical factors.
Which set of dynamics dominates, in turn, I posit, depends on inclusiveness in innovation –
regarding who is innovating, for consumption by whom, and on what terms. Discussions about
inclusion in innovation are not new – for decades there has been a concerted push to increase the
representation of women and minorities in the workplace,198 for example. However, the
conception of inclusion in innovation, I argue, needs to be enlarged, to focus not only on
employment, but on the production, design, and consumption of innovation and to be seen as a
byproduct of not only individual firm conditions, but broader institutional arrangements and
contexts.
For example, as discussed earlier, the main mechanism by which innovation increases
inequality is through increased returns to innovation capital, which include training and skills,
resources, education, networks, and intellectual property. But if each individual with talent
actually had an equal opportunity to acquire these forms of capital – regardless of credentials,
parental income, and race – there is no reason that heightened returns to innovation capital
cannot ultimately compress, rather than extend, inequality. In the same vein, reducing barriers to
entry by entrants– whether by limiting the impact of lobbying, minimizing regulation, or
reducing unconscious bias – can counter winner-take-all dynamics that in the long-term stifle
growth.
The case for paying attention to inclusion across the innovation pipeline is strong. In the
production of innovation, ensuring that opportunities are available to a diverse set of innovators
supports new firm entry, increases the chances of “found Einsteins,” and promotes social
mobility. In the design of innovation, encouraging innovation that meets the needs of
underrepresented stakeholders – whether general-purpose or tailored to such groups – influences
their social impact. Likewise, the speed at which innovative products, including those which
especially benefit lower-income audiences are disseminated is key to determining the size and
persistency of the gap between the haves and have-nots. As Schumpeter has said, underscoring
the importance of the inclusive dissemination of new goods, “the capitalist achievement does not
typically consist in providing more silk stockings for queens but in bringing them within the
reach of factory girls in return for steadily decreasing amounts of effort... [and][]progressively
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raises the standard of life of the masses.”199 Innovation policy is rife with interventions to
redistribute attention and resources among innovators, including the Orphan Drug Act, which
stimulates the development of drugs to treat rare diseases impacting small numbers of
individuals residing in the United States, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program, which pays millions of dollars every year to American small businesses to engage in
federal R&D with commercialization potential,200 and as discussed in the next part, numerous
inclusionary tweaks to the patent system.
But a problem that plagues the study and evaluation of the distribution of innovation is
that it is hard to observe and measure. For example, it is currently easier to count the quantity of
issued patents than it is to discern their demographic or distributional qualities. This lack of
available information makes it difficult to evaluate the status quo, as well as discern whether
particular interventions are working. However, as the next Part demonstrates, there are ways to
get around existing constraints, and value in doing so.
Part III: Inequality and Inclusion Metrics: The Example of New Patent Applications and
Grants
The last Part provided a framework for considering the relationship between inequality,
innovation, and intellectual property and made the case for devoting greater attention and rigor to
measuring inclusion in innovation. This Part provides an example of how to so with reference to
one particular innovative activity: applying for and getting a patent. The cultivation of innovators
in a way that promotes equal opportunity and the inclusion of the most talented, not the most
privileged, and the firms with the best new ideas and ways of bringing them to market, not the
best lobbyists, has many dimensions, just one of which is patenting. However, patenting has
some advantages as a point of entry for exploring inclusion metrics: the records are open, they
are granular, and they have widely been studied as a proxy for the amount201 if not the
distribution of overall innovation. While patents are also highly imperfect as measures of
absolute levels of innovation,202 they do support observing relative trends in innovation across
decades, geographies, and innovators.
Just as importantly, much effort has gone into improving inclusion in patenting. For
example, over the past several decades lawmakers have enacted numerous provisions to support
small businesses and inventors to address the long-recognized challenges faced by smaller
innovators when applying for patents.203 These include fee discounts, pro bono assistance,204 the
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preservation of a “grace period” in filing which allows for delays in application fees, and the
ability to opt out of the mandatory 18-month publication of applications. However there has also
been serious concern that other policies, such as the award of a patent to the first entity to file
rather than invent, which took effect in March 2013 following the passage of the America
Invents Act, have harmed small inventors and discouraged their participation.205
Despite these policies and controversies, curiously little is known about the participation
of small entities in the patent system, whether or not policies enacted to support their
participation are working, and how they have (or have not) been impacted by recent changes in
the law. Nor has much attention been paid to the degree to which industries, geographies, and
sectors differ in their levels of inclusion of these groups, or how patenting has been distributed.
The following subsections turn to these questions.
1. The Share of Patents Filed by Small Entities Has Declined Since 2000
As described earlier, one of the problems with inclusion is the difficulty of observing and
measuring it. One way to address this problem in the realm of patenting is by taking advantage of
to-date underexplored sources of information about the patenting process that can be used to
distinguish between the behavior of small entities, independent inventors, and others: patent fee
payment records and entity classifiers developed by the USPTO that can be used to distinguish
between types of patent filers.
Since at least 1983, a 50% discount off of fees paid to the Patent Office has been
available to help small filers, including for-profit firm with less than 500 employees, independent
inventors, and nonprofits.206 Starting in early 2013, filers that fall below certain revenue and
filing thresholds have been eligible for even deeper “micro entity” discounts of 75% off. 207 In
order to get a discount, an applicant or patentee must make a legal declaration that it qualifies
each time it pays a fee.208 Because parties have financial incentives to make these declarations in 2018, micro-entities only paid $430 to file their application, as compared to an undiscounted
something wrong? How else can a man feel, when he is met by such difficulties at every turn? . . . How hard
on me [is the process of applying for a patent] to put me to all that expense . . .” Cʜᴀʀʟᴇꜱ Dɪᴄᴋᴇɴꜱ, Pʀɪɴᴄᴇ
Bᴜʟʟ ᴀɴᴅ A Pᴏᴏʀ Mᴀɴ’ꜱ Tᴀʟᴇ ᴏꜰ Pᴀᴛᴇɴᴛ 21 (Rise of Douai 2014) (1850).
204
Described in Peter Lee, Towards a Distributive Agenda for the Patent System, 55 Hᴏᴜꜱ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 321, ___
(2017).
205
See, e.g., Eric P. Vandenburg, America Invents Act: How It Affects Small Businesses, 50 Iᴅᴀʜᴏ L. Rᴇᴠ. 217-222
(2013) (predicting harm to small inventors from the America Invents Act)
206
Lee, supra note ___. See also American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4711–4712, 113 Stat.
1501A–552, at 1501A–572-75 (1999) (providing that the USPTO “shall recognize the public interest in continuing
to safeguard broad access to the United States patent system through the reduced fee structure for small entities.”)
207
The fee change is described at New Fees and Micro Entity Status Take Effect March 19, Iɴᴠᴇɴᴛᴏʀ’ꜱ Eʏᴇ (Feb.
2013), https://www.uspto.gov/custom-page/inventors-eye-advice (requiring that microentities must, among other
requirements, “not be named on more than four previously filed applications” and “not have a gross median income
more than three times the median househod income in the previous year”).
208
I tracked the status of entities at the point of application, patent issuance (roughly 2-4 years following
application), and maintenance fees (payable at 3.5, 7, and 10.5 years after the patent’s grant). It should be noted that
an applicant or patentee may “drop” out of the process at any point beyond filing.
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rate of $1720209 - and are penalized for making false declarations,210 this article assumes that the
share of discounted filings is a good proxy for the share of small entity filers. Each time an
applicant or patentee submits a fee eligible for discounting to the USPTO - at the point of filing,
prosecution, and then maintenance - thus presents an opportunity to observe its size.
When a patent is granted, the USPTO also classifies the owner of the patent into one of
several categories, including US corporation and US individual,211 providing another source of
entity information. Although to date, entity records have not been readily public available, with
the assistance of the USPTO Office of Chief Economist, I was able to determine, based on
payment records, the prevalence of small (including “small” and “micro”) entity filings at the
USPTO as compared to large entity filings,212 as well the share of independent inventors.213
Fig. 3A: Small and Micro Entity Shares Over Time

The data show a clear trend: the share of US patent applications filed by small (and
“micro”) entities, has declined from around 33% in 2000 to 28.5% in 2015. Examination at the
USPTO is segmented into six “Technology Centers,” each with an area of technical focus, and a
decline in small entity share over this period was observed across every Center except
209

USPTO, USPTO Fee Schedule - United States Patent and Trademark Office, effective January 16, 2018
(including the filing, examination, and search fees paid when a patent is initially filed).
210
See 37 CFR 1.27 (h) (defining knowing improper claiming of small entity status as “fraud” on the office, which
can result in making the patent enforceable).
211
USPTO PatentsView QueryTool Data Dictionary, available at
http://www.patentsview.org/querydev/query/data_dictionary.html (defining the USPTO’s classification of patent
owners into the following categories: US Company or Corporation, Foreign Company or Corporation, US
Individual, Foreign Individual, US Government, Foreign Government, Country Government, State Government
(US))
212
From 2005 to the present, the USPTO has over 98% of entity status data associated with patent filing, in 20002005, the shares range from 6.5-10%. Correspondence with the USPTO, January 2018 on file with the author.
213
Available through PatentsView, supra note ___.
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(Chemistry, Computers and Communications, Electrical, Mechanical, and Miscellaneous
Centers) besides Biology.
Taken at face value, these trends are striking and troubling. Small entities are filing a
shrinking share of new patents, suggesting that the patent system is becoming more, not less
inclusive over time. This runs directly counter to the policy objectives of Congress’ recent
creation of the micro-entity status tier and longstanding interest in broad-based participation.214
What might be behind the decline?
One policy concern has been that changes in the law, in particular, the transition to
awarding a patent to the first inventor to file, rather than invent, has discouraged small and
independent inventors from filing. An analysis by Abrams and Wagner based of an analogous
change in the law in Canada predicted that the 2013 US rule change was “likely to result in a
reduced share of patents granted to individual inventors.”215 However, the data do not support
this result, at least not yet. The relative shares of small and micro entity filings have actually
slightly grown from 2012 to the present, from 32% to 33% of filings,216 following the
introduction of micro-entity status. This change is too small, and the period of observation too
soon after the rule change to conclude that the change in the law has caused the longer term
decline in small entity shares to be halted or reversed. However, a view of filings by various
entity types during the 2000 to 2015 period reveals a perhaps unlikely culprit of the observed
decline – growth in large foreign corporation patenting during this period, coupled with, lowered
rates of small entity filings by foreign companies. That is to say, just as is the case of white US
computer science graduate students as described in Part I, the absolute number (and US share) of
small entity filings are not decreasing, it’s just that growth in foreign filings (which feature a
smaller proportion of small filers) has outstripped US small entity growth. Further, no decline in
small entity and individual inventor filing and patenting rates has been observed since the
transition of a first to file regime as many predicted, and in fact, there is some evidence that
filings by small and micro-entities are up since 2012, when the smallest entities became eligible
for even deeper discounts.
In addition to the overall downward trend of small entity filing, I also found a successive
decrease in small entity shares across the lifetime of a patent – which is to say, the share of
patentees that was small at each phase of a patent was smaller than the phase before it. (Fig. 3B)

Fig. 3B: Small and Entity Shares Over the Patent Lifecycle

214

Detailed in Innovators, supra note ___ at Part I.
David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act and Individual
Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, Abstract (2013)
216
Based on data provided by the USPTO, from approximately 16.2K in 2012 applications to 15.5K 2015
applications.
215

37

INEQUALITY, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

For example, 33% of patent applications filed in 2000 were by small entities, but by the time of
patent issuance, that share had shrunk to 25%, and to 23%, 18% and 15% with respect to first,
second, and third maintenance fees. (Fig.3B) This trend was observed across all the periods
studied.217 If low fees are encouraging small and independent inventors to file for patents, but
they drop out before the patent issues, the applicant will have lost attorney, USPTO and other
possible fees associated with the patent’s filings, with little to show for it, with implications for
policy-making.
2. Inequality in New Patent Grants: The Few Increasingly Have Many
Another way to measure inclusion in patenting is to consider the extent to which new
patent grants are concentrated. Economists use several ways to measure the degree of
concentration within a set of values. The most popular of these is the Gini coefficient, a value
between zero and one that represents the difference between perfect equality and reality. In the
income context, for example, the Gini coefficient is equal to zero when everyone makes the same
and there is perfect equality, while the Gini coefficient is equal to one (or 100%) when one
person makes all the money, and there is perfect inequality.218 Two other ways to measure
inequality are top decile and top percent ownership, which represent the shares of the total held
by the top 10% or 1% of owners, respectively. Though typically applied to income distributions,
economists have also applied these metrics to measure the distribution of goods, behaviors, and
services.219
217

Because patent fees are paid up to 10.5 years following issuance, and it takes, on average, 2-4 years to get a
patent, this Article reports on filings until 2004 to minimize truncation effects.
218
For an overview of inequality metrics, their use, and how to calculate them, see Jᴏɴᴀᴛʜᴀɴ Hᴀᴜɢʜᴛᴏɴ &
Sʜᴀʜɪᴅᴜʀ R. Kʜᴀɴᴅᴋᴇʀ, Inequality Measures, in HANDBOOK ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (2009).
219
See, e.g., Vinod Thomas et al., Measuring Education Inequality: Gini Coefficients of Education (World Bank,
Pol’y Research, Working Paper No. 2525, 2001) (education Ginis); Victor Sadras & Rodolfo Bongiovanni, Use of
Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients to Assess Yield Inequality Within Paddocks, 90 FIELD CROPS RES. 303 (2004)
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To analyze the distribution of ownership requires standardized ownership data, which
historically has not been available from the USPTO as owners are free to vary the ways in which
they identify themselves. The single corporation IBM, for example, has been estimated to have
as many as 2,000 different names within USPTO records.220 This study leverages vast efforts
made over the past decade by private firms, the USPTO, and other governments to normalize
ownership records, to determine the Gini coefficient, top percent ownership, and top decile
ownership for the past decades.
This Article finds that grant of new patents has grown increasingly concentrated by each
inequality measure – the Gini coefficient, top percent ownership, and top decile ownership –
from the mid-1980s to the present. (Fig.3 C) From 1986 to 2016, the share of patents held by the
top percent of grantees has increased from 38% to 53%, the share held by the top decile has
increased from 70% to 78%,221 and the Gini value, from 0.71 to .79. It is noticeable, as the figure
depicts, that the growth in inequality over the last several decades does not represent a “new”
trend, but, rather, reflects decades-long trends.222

(agricultural Ginis); Mary Amiti, Specialization Patterns in Europe, 135 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV [REV.
WORLD ECON.] 573 (1999) (industry concentration); & Jᴀᴍᴇꜱ Cᴜʟʟɪꜱ & Bᴀʀʙᴀʀᴀ ᴠᴀɴ Kᴏᴘᴘᴇɴ, Aᴘᴘʟʏɪɴɢ ᴛʜᴇ
Gɪɴɪ Cᴏᴇꜰꜰɪᴄɪᴇɴᴛ ᴛᴏ Mᴇᴀꜱᴜʀᴇ Iɴᴇǫᴜᴀʟɪᴛʏ ᴏꜰ Wᴀᴛᴇʀ Uꜱᴇ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Oʟɪꜰᴀɴᴛꜱ Rɪᴠᴇʀ Wᴀᴛᴇʀ Mᴀɴᴀɢᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ
Aʀᴇᴀ, Sᴏᴜᴛʜ Aꜰʀɪᴄᴀ (Int'l Water Mgmt. Inst., Research Rpt. No. 113, 2007) (water use).
220
Innography, a source of patent data, has estimated that there are over 1,000 names for IBM alone. Patent
Database Quality: What is Data Quality, Iɴɴᴏɢʀᴀᴘʜʏ, https://www.innography.com/why-innography/data-quality.
221
Though not exactly, as 1986 patent grant inequality represents a decline from 1976 patent grant inequality, then a
rise thereafter.
222
Although distributions of household incomes are not directly comparable to distributions of patent ownership,
just as a point of comparison, countries with the most unequal distribution of incomes including Lesotho and South
Africa have Gini coefficients of around 63%, while the U.S. Gini coefficient is closer to 45%. Central Intelligence
Agency, Country Comparison: Distribution of Family Income – Gini Index, WORLD FACTBOOK. Income is
distributed most evenly in Europe, with Sweden, Slovenia, and Denmark bottoming the list with Gini values of
around 25%. Id. Closer in value and perhaps in concept to patent ownership are corporate profits. Herman Schwartz
calculated the Gini coefficient of profits among firms in in the Forbes Global 2000 (FG2k), finding it to be around
0.744 among U.S. firms and 0.649 among firms worldwide, from 2006 to 2014. Schwartz, supra note ___, at 226.
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Fig. 3C: The Concentration of Patent Grants Over Time

Data Sources: USPTO Patent Publications Dataset (1900-2011),223
USPTO PatentsView (2012-2016)224
What is driving increases in inequality and the distribution of new patents over the last
few decades? Though an exhaustive analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, multiple factors
could be at play. Changes in the configuration of firms, for example through “merger mania”
beginning in the 1980’s,225 have resulted in fewer firms holding more assets. Shifts in the
settings of invention have also contributed to the growing concentration of holdings, as the share
of patents to independent inventors has declined though, by 1976, the rate of independent
invention had already shrunk to 18% of all patents.226 But new entry can also contribute to
growing inequality, if the number of owners of new patents rises quickly, and correspondingly,
grows the number of owners that belongs in the top share.

Fig. 3D: Shares of Patent Grants to the Top 1% By Sector
223

Available in Google Patents Public Data, provided by IFI CLAIMS Patent Services, at
https://bigquery.cloud.google.com/dataset/patents-public-data:patents.
224
The USPTO changed how it accounted for unassigned patents in its Patents Publication dataset in 2011, hence,
the analysis relies on PatentsView for that last period.
225
Described, e.g., in Richard B. Du Boff & Edward S. Herman, Mergers, Concentration, and the Erosion of
Democracy, MONTHLY REV. (May 2001), http://monthlyreview.org/2001/05/01/mergers-concentration-and-theerosion-of-democracy/ (providing a critical review of this period, during which, for example, mergers with prices
exceeding $1B averaged twenty per year in the early 1990s, then climbed steadily to 208 in 2000).
226
Chien, Innovators¸ supra note __, tbl.3D.
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However, more is going on than just a shift in overall new patents to the electrical engineering
sector. The chemical, mechanical, instruments, and electrical engineering sectors have all
experienced growth in new grant inequality from 1986 to the present. Though the increase has
been much greater among electrical engineering patents (70% to 82% from 1976 in 2016), than
among, for example mechanical patent grants (57% to 66%) in each technology sector besides
chemistry,227 the gap between those who hold the most new patents and those who hold the least
has grown. (Fig. 3D) Further work to consider the role of foreign patenters, which tend to be
larger, is warranted.
There could be another explanation that’s driven less by fundamental shifts in the
distribution of innovation, but instead the shift in the economy towards complex, electrical
engineering products and the dynamics of their patent acquisition. Because complex products
tend to be covered by large numbers of patents, shifting towards electrical engineering products,
for example, grows the gap between companies with many products rather than few. High-tech
companies that have long specialized in products characterized by cumulative, rather than
discrete innovation also shifted their patent acquisition strategies during this period. Although in
the 1980s and 1990s many innovative companies had few patents, by the 2000s, the practice of
accumulating large numbers of patents to gain freedom to operate and deter others from suing, or
“defensive patenting” was widespread.228
227

A category defined by Shmoch, supra note ___ as including pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, chemistry and
environmental technology.
228
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the
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A review of industry inequality metrics confirms that industry effects are strong. In 2016,
83% of new electrical engineering patents was granted to the top 10% of recipients, as compared
to 53% - 68% among chemical, mechanical, and instrument grants in the same year. (Fig.3D)
This is not a new phenomenon - electrical engineering patent grants have consistently been the
most concentrated since 1976. (Fig.3D) As the share of patents that are electrical engineering
grows, one would expect that the overall Gini coefficient would rise, even if individual sector
Ginis did not. Indeed, led by IBM, which has been the top grantee for several decades, computer
firms, and in particular, American and Asian hardware and software firms dominate the top list
of grantees.229
3. Conclusion and Extensions
This exercise demonstrates the value of focusing rigorously on inclusion in innovation
can yield, and also suggests further directions and extensions. The distribution of patent filings
by entity size and profile can directly speak to the impact of recent Congressional and USPTO
interventions (first to file) that were feared to alternatively discourage participation, as well as
intended to encourage participation (lower fees and related interventions). The data suggests that
no decline in absolute or relative small entity participation has been observed in the years
following the rule changes. However, the observed decline over the longer period of time is
notable, as are the higher attrition rate associated with small entities, and steadily increasing
inequality in the grant of new patents. In both cases, patent filings by foreign firms, which
feature a smaller proportion of small entities, and that have dominated the list of top patentees,
have played an important role.
These, as well as other metrics of inclusion in innovation are worth further exploration
and inquiry. For example, considering where small entities are located geographically can expose
the role that they are playing in different parts of the country, and in what sectors. Further,
distinguishing between types of small entities, as well as the demographic qualities of inventors,
can also illuminate what fields are relatively more or less inclusive, and which are more
concentrated. Considering entry and invention by new firms – for example, through the share of
individuals or firms that represents a “first-time” inventor – may also provide an easy and useful
way to track innovation entry.
Part IV: Conclusion
Innovation is often thought to be a meritocracy, the product of talent, technical merit, and
hard work. Innovation is often thought to be apolitical, divorced from broader social and political
trends. Innovation is often thought to be about personal achievement and defying the odds, not
about privilege and gaming the system. This article has explored the connections between
Patent System, 62 Hᴀꜱᴛɪɴɢꜱ L.J. 297, 303-04 (2010).
229
IFI CLAIMS Announces 2017 Top U.S. Patent Recipients, Jan 2018, https://globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2018/01/09/1285704/0/en/IFI-CLAIMS-Announces-2017-Top-U-S-Patent-Recipients.html (commenting on
IBM’s 25-year streak as the top patenters, as well as the prominent positions on the list occupied by Cannon,
Samsung, LG, Google and others).
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innovation, inequality, and intellectual property, and found innovation and intellectual property
to be, in contrast with these perceptions, both a product and driver of the broader institutional,
historical, and social arrangements and trends that dictate who gets to participate in innovation,
what innovations get developed, and how innovations are distributed. As Part I explores, through
three patents covering a mousetrap, the material Gore-Tex, and database automation techniques
innovation has shifted over the last several decades, away from manufacturing-based, domestic,
independent innovation, and towards information technology-based, foreign, and coastal
innovation. Rather than endorsing any single account, these trends support at least two distinct
narratives, one about growing the innovation pie, through the prosperous and diverse digital
revolution and another about the shrinking allocation of this pie to “American,” manufacturingbased innovation.
Part II builds on this part to offer a framework for unifying various, to date largely
disconnected, narratives, literatures and populist accounts about the relationship between
innovation and inequality. Innovation can increase inequality – through sorting and segregation,
rent-seeking (whether in the pursuit of favorable intellectual property rules, rents from the rich,
or credentials), and the recent clustering of those with high skills into elite firms, neighborhoods,
and coastal locations – but it doesn’t have to. It can just as well decrease inequality through the
broad-based diffusion of new goods and services, boosting social mobility, and boosting social
mixing. Institutions, technology, and systems-level context matters, and intellectual property can
both support, as well as hinder, both sets of mechanisms. It argues that one key to whether or not
any given innovation makes inequality worse or better stems from inclusiveness across the
innovation pipeline. The metrics we have to date focused on measure the quantity of innovation
but metrics that reflect the distribution of innovation – for example, reflecting entry and
participation by underrepresented groups and geographies – deserve more attention.
Part III describes one example of how to measure inclusion in innovation as
recommended by Part II, in the domain of patent filings and grants. It documents, for the first
time, both the increasingly unequal distribution of new patent grants and decreasing share of
patent filings by small entities from 2000 to the present. As those who shape innovation
including educators, policymakers, firms continue to try to fulfill the promise of technology
improving the lives of all, keeping in mind the dynamics discussed in this Article just may
increase the chances it will do so.

APPENDIX
Table 1: Grant Densities (patents/10K residents)
2016 State 1976

1986

1996
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2006

2016
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Rank

(1H)

1

CA

22.7

16.2

27.6

47.2

77.1

2

NC

7.5

8.0

18.2

30.6

42.6

3

CT

22.0

20.1

27.4

29.6

34.5

4

PA

33.0

24.6

29.7

27.1

34.2

5

VA

13.3

9.4

14.8

17.8

31.0

6

TX

15.2

14.2

20.6

24.9

30.1

7

GA

3.4

3.8

8.2

11.3

22.3

8

NJ

31.2

18.8

18.2

16.3

17.7

9

IA

4.6

3.3

3.7

4.5

12.3

10

MD

7.9

5.3

8.8

10.5

12.0

11

CO

1.7

1.6

3.6

6.1

11.8

12

WI

4.2

4.3

7.2

9.4

11.7

13

WA

1.1

1.2

2.3

6.0

10.9

14

OH

9.7

6.5

7.9

7.3

10.8

15

SC

3.5

3.4

6.7

7.4

10.4

16

MA

4.5

3.3

4.9

7.1

9.6

17

MI

5.9

5.0

6.8

7.3

8.8

18

IL

6.6

4.4

5.4

5.2

7.6

19

AL

5.6

4.8

4.6

5.4

7.4

20

NY

4.1

2.9

4.7

5.2

7.3

Data Sources: USPTO Patents View, US Census.
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